The Pakistan Problem.
I recently finished reading the book 'The Idea of Pakistan' by Stephen Cohen. I picked up the book so as to get to know how Pakistan is thought of in American intellectual circles. I am not really surprised by what I read. Cohen's views of Pak are no doubt well thought out and articulated. But the conclusions could use some questionings. If the views in the book represent the outlook of a majority of American policy-makers, it would explain America's relationship with Pak.
For one, the basic premise of the book seems to be that Pak politicians and Generals are secular at heart. He points out how Jinnah was a secular intellectual who carved out Pakistan because he feared the Muslims would be side-lined by the majority Hindus. But Jinnah was also a close associate of Gandhi and Nehru. He was well aware of the staunch secular credentials of the Congress leadership. Why then did he incite religious passions in order to get his way. The more logical answer would be that he realised that in a democracy, because of muslims being in a minority, HIS INFLUENCE AND POWER would decline. To say that Jinnah created Pak only to give muslims a home land of their own is too naive. The same holds for the Army. It maybe true that the leaders of the army are largely secular in their private life. But it's their professional beliefs that matter, not private, when it comes to governance, foreign policy et al. The fact remains that they actively consort with Islamic terrorists and fundamentalists in order to further their agenda. And that in itself puts a question mark on their secular credentials in professional life. Their hypocrisy and untrustworthiness is displayed when, one one hand, they argue (to the US) that they are Pakistan's best chance, that without them the country will become a haven for terrorists and on the other, they actively train fund and support these same terrorists.
Cohen argues that Pakistan can progress if it improves relations with India and that this process could be hastened if India showed a flexible attitude towards Pakistan and provided it with a fait accompli so it could sell an unpopular Kashmir 'solution' to it's citizen. Here the author is assuming that Pakistan wants a solution to the Kashmir problem and a normalization of relations with India. This in itself is a questionable assumption because such an occurrence is likely to undermine the power of the Pak establishment. If there are more people to people contacts, Pakistanis may come to realize that Indian muslims enjoy much more political freedom and freedom of expression than they do. That Indian muslims have much more educational, economic and social opportunities than not just Pakistani Hindus but Pakistani Muslims as well. They might realize that in India, the children with a solid middle-class background can come to the US for Graduate Studies. This would be disastrous for the Pakistani elite who rule the country. Pakistan has always made a lot of profit from it's 'strategic location'. This notion is also tied to it's propaganda that it acts as a 'buffer' against Hindu India. If a normalization of relations occurs and leads to healthy and profitable relationship between India and say Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan looses it's strategic location card.
But to me, the most important question is, even though all the above were not true, why should India compromise? The Kashmir problem is no doubt a big headache which bleeds India. But does it cripple it? No. India is a emerging power whose large economy, population and resources can suffer this problem. Secondly, given the weak/hypocritic/untrusthworthy Pak establishment should India be negotiating with them at all? Why should India give concessions in order to help US foreign policy?
The fact of the matter is the very basis of Pakistan's survival is anti-Indianism. From the hypocritic Jinnah to the cunning and manipulative Musharraf, all Pakistani leaders need India as an enemy to shore up their regimes. What India needs to do is marginalize Pakistan, not in the world, but in it's own foreign policy. India should realize that because of it's large and growing economy and trade, it has to now think and act on a different level. Only by displaying to Pakistan that it enters into Indian calculations only as a dangerous but small pest which needs to be kept an sharp eye on but nothing more, will it be able to reduce the perceived strategic importance of Pakistan in the eyes of US and China. Only by marginalizing Pakistan in it's own foreign policy can it communicate to the US that hyphenating between India and Pakistan is ultimately to their detriment. This will go a long way in atleast alleviating one of the many problems India faces: the Pakistan Problem.
For one, the basic premise of the book seems to be that Pak politicians and Generals are secular at heart. He points out how Jinnah was a secular intellectual who carved out Pakistan because he feared the Muslims would be side-lined by the majority Hindus. But Jinnah was also a close associate of Gandhi and Nehru. He was well aware of the staunch secular credentials of the Congress leadership. Why then did he incite religious passions in order to get his way. The more logical answer would be that he realised that in a democracy, because of muslims being in a minority, HIS INFLUENCE AND POWER would decline. To say that Jinnah created Pak only to give muslims a home land of their own is too naive. The same holds for the Army. It maybe true that the leaders of the army are largely secular in their private life. But it's their professional beliefs that matter, not private, when it comes to governance, foreign policy et al. The fact remains that they actively consort with Islamic terrorists and fundamentalists in order to further their agenda. And that in itself puts a question mark on their secular credentials in professional life. Their hypocrisy and untrustworthiness is displayed when, one one hand, they argue (to the US) that they are Pakistan's best chance, that without them the country will become a haven for terrorists and on the other, they actively train fund and support these same terrorists.
Cohen argues that Pakistan can progress if it improves relations with India and that this process could be hastened if India showed a flexible attitude towards Pakistan and provided it with a fait accompli so it could sell an unpopular Kashmir 'solution' to it's citizen. Here the author is assuming that Pakistan wants a solution to the Kashmir problem and a normalization of relations with India. This in itself is a questionable assumption because such an occurrence is likely to undermine the power of the Pak establishment. If there are more people to people contacts, Pakistanis may come to realize that Indian muslims enjoy much more political freedom and freedom of expression than they do. That Indian muslims have much more educational, economic and social opportunities than not just Pakistani Hindus but Pakistani Muslims as well. They might realize that in India, the children with a solid middle-class background can come to the US for Graduate Studies. This would be disastrous for the Pakistani elite who rule the country. Pakistan has always made a lot of profit from it's 'strategic location'. This notion is also tied to it's propaganda that it acts as a 'buffer' against Hindu India. If a normalization of relations occurs and leads to healthy and profitable relationship between India and say Iran and Afghanistan, Pakistan looses it's strategic location card.
But to me, the most important question is, even though all the above were not true, why should India compromise? The Kashmir problem is no doubt a big headache which bleeds India. But does it cripple it? No. India is a emerging power whose large economy, population and resources can suffer this problem. Secondly, given the weak/hypocritic/untrusthworthy Pak establishment should India be negotiating with them at all? Why should India give concessions in order to help US foreign policy?
The fact of the matter is the very basis of Pakistan's survival is anti-Indianism. From the hypocritic Jinnah to the cunning and manipulative Musharraf, all Pakistani leaders need India as an enemy to shore up their regimes. What India needs to do is marginalize Pakistan, not in the world, but in it's own foreign policy. India should realize that because of it's large and growing economy and trade, it has to now think and act on a different level. Only by displaying to Pakistan that it enters into Indian calculations only as a dangerous but small pest which needs to be kept an sharp eye on but nothing more, will it be able to reduce the perceived strategic importance of Pakistan in the eyes of US and China. Only by marginalizing Pakistan in it's own foreign policy can it communicate to the US that hyphenating between India and Pakistan is ultimately to their detriment. This will go a long way in atleast alleviating one of the many problems India faces: the Pakistan Problem.
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